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In the 150 years since the first lectures on contracts were given
at The Dickinson School of Law, time has wrought change and
growth both in the institution and in the field of contract law. It
would seem appropriate in this sesquicentennial year to examine
some of the changes in this legal discipline which, because of its logi-
cal cohesion, has made itself an ideal first-year subject through
which to introduce the rigors of the legal method.
The effort early in the common law was to develop rules which
would be applicable to different types of contracts in almost any situ-
ation. This differed somewhat from the civil law in which the empha-
sis tended to be on the type of contract involved, like transportation
contracts as distinguished from real estate contracts or service con-
tracts. In this century, the common law, influenced in part by statu-
tory and administrative rules, has tended to distinguish between
specific fields of contract expertise, particularly government con-
tracting in which special technical rules govern bidding, the expendi-
ture of funds and the settlement of disputes. Real estate transac-
tions, the marriage contract and sale of goods have their own
particular contract rules. Labor-management contracting is a special
field, as is insurance law. Underlying these special fields, however,
general contract principles and many particular rules still are univer-
sally relevant.
II. The "Codification" of Contract Law
The cases that dealt with all the facets of contract law plethora
of in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries caused research diffi-
culties and uncertainty in the law. Even if the law in a particular
area was found, its applicability was often unclear because many as-
pects of it were only partially developed. The numerous rules were
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. B.S.C. 1947, Xavier University; J.D.
1949, University of Cincinnati; M.A., LL.M. 1960, Georgetown University.
never organized into any logical order. This absence of codification
may seem unusual to continental lawyers who are accustomed to law
organized into various codes which legislatures enacted rather than
law which courts developed piecemeal. Nevertheless, four develop-
ments occurred in this century that significantly clarified and organ-
ized the many contractual rules.
A. The Restatement of Contracts (1932)
The First Restatement of the case law of contracts was pub-
lished by the American Law Institute in 1932. By means of 609
rules, each with its own explanation and illustrations, the First Re-
statement sought to integrate the law of contracts. These rules were
gathered mostly from the cases themselves. Although the Restate-
ment was not adopted by a legislature and, therefore, was not bind-
ing on the courts, it nevertheless provided excellent guidance for the
courts.' Not only did the drafters of the Restatement codify the case
law but in several instances they sought to promulgate rules which
they thought were desirable, even though the law had not yet devel-
oped to that extent. The following three examples illustrate this de-
velopment of the law through the First Restatement.
1. Consideration as the basis for enforcing promises.-At
common law, a contract is defined as a promise for the breach of
which the law gives a remedy.2 This definition immediately implies
that there are promises for the breach of which the law does not give
a remedy. These promises are not termed contracts.8 Historically,
the promises that were enforced in the early English common law
were promises of three types: (1) written promises given under seal;
(2) promises for which the promise incurred a detriment; and (3)
promises on the basis of which the promises conferred a benefit on
the promisor.
This third set of promises may be illustrated by the relationship
between a creditor and a debtor. One person loans money on the
basis of the other person's promise to repay it with interest. This
promise is enforceable because a benefit has been conferred on the
1. This guidance was particularly noticeable in extending the reach of promissory estop-
pel, in the irrevocabilities of unilateral offers, in rights of defaulting plaintiffs and in intended
third-party beneficiaries.
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §
1 (1932).
3. Promises for the breach of which the law does not give a remedy are illusory
promises, promises induced by fraud or duress, promises of minors, illegal contracts, promises
to marry in most jurisdictions, promises induced by certain types of mistake, promises the
performance of which would be unconscionable, economically impractical, or impossible, and
gratuitous promises, or promises given without consideration. The latter promise has en-
couraged the growth of promissory estoppel.
promisor. An example of the second category, a detriment incurred
by the promise, would be the transportation of a horse by a ferryman
across a river during which he injures the horse. Because of the fer-
ryman's promise to transport the horse, the owner of the horse suf-
fered a detriment in turning the horse over to him. In the last 200
years, the first set of promises, promises under seal, has fallen into
disuse. The other two promises, however, still remain; detriment in-
curred by the promisee and benefit conferred by the promisee.
This rule of benefit conferred and detriment incurred formed
the basis for the enforceability of promises. Moreover, it evolved into
the present-day rule of "consideration"; a promise is not enforced
unless "consideration" has been given for it.' Consideration in the
last century came to mean "bargain." The benefit conferred or detri-
ment incurred was bargained for and given by the promisee in ex-
change for the promise.5 The promise or bargain therefore was en-
forceable. However, gratuitous promises were not enforceable, even
if the promisee, on the basis of the gratuitous promise, later incurred
a detriment. 6 In such circumstances, the detriment was not bar-
gained for and given in exchange for the promise.
This same denial of enforceability was applicable to promises
given out of gratitude for past services. For example, suppose an em-
ployee worked overtime without pay for an employer for a length of
time. The employer then promises to pay him a bonus of a thousand
dollars in gratitude for his service. It is impossible for the service to
be bargained for and given in exchange for the promise when the
service preceded the promise in time. Therefore, promises of this
type could not be enforced.
In this century, the doctrine of consideration, or bargain, as the
sole basis for the enforceability of a promise partially has been un-
dermined by the concept of promissory estoppel in the First Restate-
ment and by the contract modification rules of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and the Second Restatement.
Because the doctrine of consideration did not seem adequate in
determining all the promises that should be enforced, the First Re-
statement set forth several examples of promises that should be en-
forced without consideration. These promises are gratuitous and,
therefore, are not bargained for. The chief example is a promise
upon which the promisee later relied to his detriment. 7 Thus, estop-
4. See Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69
COLUNM. L. REv. 576, 598 (1969).
5. "[B]argain is always an agreement for an exchange." 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS § 10, at 22 (1963).
6. See Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845), implying that detriment incurred on the
basis of a gratuitous promise was not a sufficient basis for the enforcement of the promise.
7. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
pel was introduced into all aspects of the law of contracts. Estoppel
had its beginnings before 1932 in bailments, charitable subscriptions
and family promises, but the adoption by the Restatement of a gen-
eral principle of estoppel greatly expanded the type of promise that
could be enforced without a bargain. If a gratuitous promise is made
and the other party reasonably relies thereon, that promise may be
enforced against a promisor who attempts to revoke it.' This reli-
ance, however, had to be of a substantial nature and had to be in-
curred only by the promisee, not by a third party.'
2. Third-party beneficiaries.-Since the 1859 landmark New
York case of Lawrence v. Fox,10 the law dealing with third-party
beneficiaries developed slowly. The First Restatement hastened this
development." The common law resisted the idea that a party who
was not the promisee of a promise, but who benefited from it could
later sue upon the promise. Both in England and in the United
States, a third party was not privy to the contract and could have no
contractual rights, and obligations under it.' 2 A common example is
the situation in which the promisor promises another to pay a debt
that the other owes to a third party, and fails to do so. Does the
third party have a contract action for breach of promise against the
promisor? The First Restatement set forth the rule that this third
party does have such an action, whether he is a creditor of the prom-
isee or a mere gratuitous donee of the promisee."3
The classification of third-party intended beneficiaries of a
promise as either a creditor or a donee of the promisee resulted in
different legal consequences for each. For example, if the promisee
owed no duty to the third party for whom he solicited the promise,
the third party's rights vested, and the promisor and promisee could
not later amend their contract to the detriment of the third party.
4
These third-party donee-beneficiaries surprisingly could prevent such
8. See Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898), holding that because the
defendant's promise had the real or apparent intention of influencing the promisee to alter her
position for the worse, and because the promisee did so in reliance on the promise, the promise
was enforceable through estoppel. The court used promissory estoppel as an extension of the
time honored doctrine of equitable estoppel.
9. See Alleghany Corp. v. James Found. of N.Y., 115 F. Supp. 282, 297 (S.D.N.Y.
1953), in which the court quoted Restatement of Contracts § 90, and stated as follows: "But,
this was not a promise on the part of James, which one 'should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character' on the part of third parties, stran-
gers to the agreement who never in fact saw it until after they had accepted the offer."
10. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
11. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 133-47 (1932).
12. See In re Rotherham Alum. & Chemical Co., 25 Ch.D. 103, 111 (1983), in which
the court stated that "an agreement between A & B that B shall pay C gives C no right of
action against B. I cannot see that there is in such a case any difference between Equity and
Common Law. It is a mere question of contract."
13. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932).
14. 2 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 396 (3d ed. 1957).
a later amendment, while a creditor-beneficiary could not unless he
somehow relied detrimentally on the promise.15 This lack of a vested
right in the creditor-beneficiary existed because the creditor-benefi-
ciary always had a cause of action against the promisee on the origi-
nal debt. The donee-beneficiary had nowhere to go if the promisor
and promisee later modified the agreement.
This illogical but rather sentimental distinction between the
vested rights of creditor and donee-beneficiaries was abandoned fifty
years later with the publication of the Second Restatement in 1981,
which permitted the rights of either to be the creditor or the donee-
beneficiary divested before they became aware of their rights under
the contract. 6 The case law, however, that developed under the First
Restatement, may not so easily abandon precedent.'
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3. The doctrine of anticipatory breach.-The doctrine of an-
ticipatory breach entered the common law in the middle of the nine-
teenth century in the famous case of Hochster v. De La Tour. 8
Most landmark English contract cases are factually very simple but
theoretically very difficult, and Hochster is no exception. In Hoch-
ster, an employer was going to leave England for a tour of Europe
and had employed the plaintiff to accompany him and to assist him
during the tour. The tour was to start on the first of June. About
May first, the employer contacted his employee-to-be and told him
that he had changed his mind and was not going to Europe. The
employee, shortly after receiving this notice, contracted with a new
employer who was going to leave for the continent on July first. The
employee then, before June first, sued his former employer for
breach of contract. The question presented was whether it was possi-
ble for the employer to breach his promise to perform before June
Ist. The court concluded that there were implied promises running
from the time of the formation of the contract until its time of per-
formance. Thus, this litigation was actually a timely suit setting
forth a present breach of an implied promise rather than a suit com-
plaining of a future breach. This reasoning has caused the law for
anticipatory breach to be treated specially, like no other breach.
There are several differences between typical breaches and an-
ticipatory breaches. First, the anticipatory breacher may cure his
breach by a timely retraction before the time of performance, pro-
15. Id. § 397.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 (1981).
17. See Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Jardel Co., 421 F.2d 1048 (3d Cir. 1970), in which
the court declined to adopt the Second Restatement modification which was then in draft form
and permitted the divesting of the rights of a third-party creditor beneficiary.
18. 2 E. & B. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853).
vided that the other party has not changed his position.1 9 In Hoch-
ster v. De La Tour the victim of the breach had obtained new em-
ployment. Therefore, his original employer could not retract the
breach. This is the only instance in which a breach not only can be
mitigated but also cured.2 0 The second difference involves the options
available to the victim of the breach. In normal contracts the victim
of a major breach may treat it as minor and may elect to remain in
the contract. Many anticipatory breach cases have stated that the
victim must treat the breach as major; which means that the con-
tract will be at an end whether this result was intended or not." The
contract only can be revived by the breacher himself, by his timely
retraction of the breach.2" A third anomaly is that there can be no
anticipatory breach if the victim has fully performed his part of the
contract;23 in such a case, the court will not find the implied promise
not to breach anticipatorily the promise to perform.
This third rule is subject to much criticism.24 The reason for the
limiting rule, however, is that the implied promise found in Hochster
is not there in fact; it is a legal fiction. To reach an equitable result
the courts find this legal fiction useful when both promises are execu-
tory. There apparently is no reason to utilize this legal fiction after
the victim has fully performed, for he no longer needs to have the
right to change his position. Moreover, he expected that the other
party would perform at a certain time. Certainly in Hochster v. De
La Tour, in which the victim had not started to perform, it seems
only just that when he hears that his employer is not going to per-
form the contract that the employee then should have the right to
change his position and to seek his remedy. That necessity does not
occur if the employee already has fully performed.
This doctrine of anticipatory breach has been restated in the
19. 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1335 (3d ed. 1957).
20. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 318 comment d (1932).
21. See G.E.J. Corp. v. Uranium Aire, Inc., 311 F.2d 749, 753 (9th Cir. 1963), in which
the court stated, "Some courts follow the theory that the repudiation of a contract obligation,
prior to the time fixed for performance, is no breach until acted upon by the promisee, while
others adopt the view that it effects an immediate breach regardless of the response of the
promisee."
22. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 319 (1932).
23. Id. § 318 comment e.
24. See 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 962, at 865 (1951), in which Corbin
states as follows:
The reasons upon which [anticipatory repudiation] can actually be sustained are
equally applicable to unilateral contracts. The harm caused to the plaintiff is
equally great in either case; and its seems strange to deny to a plaintiff a remedy
of this kind merely on the ground that he has already fully performed as his
contract has required.
See also Pollack v. Pollack, 46 SW.2d 292, 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), in which the court
stated, "The doctrine which excepts contracts fully performed by one side from the general
rule is purely arbitrary, and without foundation in any logical reason."
Restatement First25 and carried through with slight modification in
the Uniform Commercial Code26 and the Restatement Second.27
This doctrine is one of the most interesting aspects of contract law,
because the usual rules do not work to their fullest, for the breach is
actually a constructed breach; the promise being breached is not
there in fact, but is implied only in law.
B. Twentieth Century Writers
Other influences on the codification and on the development of
the law of contracts were the works of principally two writers. Sa-
muel Williston wrote his treatise in the first quarter of this century. 8
Arthur Corbin wrote his treatise in the second quarter.29 Jurists, the
name given writers of this stature in the civil law, have never been as
influential in the common law as they have been in the civil law.
Yet, these two men brought together and critically examined the en-
tire field of contract law. Their works are milestones in its develop-
ment and clarification. Williston was more doctrinaire and clearer in
the formulization of the rules he drew than was the later writer,
Corbin. Corbin tended to be flexible and more general in many of
the principles he saw at work. Researching Corbin's work is some-
times frustrating, for it lacks precision. In his time, his ideas were
closer to what actually was taking place in the cases than Williston's
earlier ideas had been. 0 Williston was very influential in the devel-
opment of the First Restatement of the Law of Contracts. Fifty
years later, Corbin left his mark on the Second Restatement.
C. Uniform Commercial Code (1958)
The third development, which took place in the 1950s and
1960s in the various states, is Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code concerning contracts for the sale of goods. Article 2 is indeed a
"codification." It has, however, a saving clause which states that
those areas not covered by the Code are covered by the common
law.31 The common law is too vast to be codified in all its details.
Even the Restatement had made no effort to do so, although it is
broader in scope than the Uniform Commercial Code.
Article 2 applies only to the sale of goods; therefore, it has no
rules for the sale of real property, for the sale of services or for con-
struction contracts. Yet Article 2 made advancements in certain ar-
25. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 318-324 (1932).
26. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-610, 2-611 (1958).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 250-254 (1981).
28. S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920).
29. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1951).
30. Review: Corbin on Contracts, 61 YALE L. REV. 1092 (1952).
31. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103 (1958).
eas of contract law, as the Restatement earlier had done. These ad-
vancements can be observed in common law rules outside the sale of
goods.32
1. Unconscionability.-For example, the Uniform Commercial
Code introduced the concept of unconscionability, which means that
the court will not enforce a term in a contract or the whole contract
if it finds the term or the contract to be unconscionable. 3 The legis-
latures of the various states, when they enacted the Code, failed to
provide the courts with adequate guidance to define unconscionabil-
ity. There are, however, certain rules that have been developed
which give some guidance to the courts as they begin to define un-
conscionability through constant application of the principle to spe-
cific fact situations.34 The first rule requires, at the beginning, an
inequality or an over-reaching in the bargaining process. For exam-
ple, a sharp and astute individual versus a ignorant person would be
considered an unequal bargaining situation. The second rule requires
that this lack of bargaining power on the part of the weaker party
result in a term that is grossly unfair.85 Guidance was also available
in equity rules which permitted the policing of bargains. These eq-
uity rules were developed long before the Restatement or the Uni-
form Commercial Code. 6 The courts always had policed bargains of
minors, permitting the avoidance of the contract if the minor so
wished.37 Power of avoidance also was extended to mental incompe-
tents and to those who were the victims of fraud or duress.38
The courts also used certain subterfuges in policing; they would
find that a term, whose effect they disliked, was ambiguous or its
meaning difficult to interpret, when it actually was not.3' The courts
did not want to enforce the provision, but they felt constrained from
making bold assertions that such terms cannot be inserted into con-
tracts, absent legislative authorization. In the common law, a deep-
seated commitment to freedom of contract exists which allows the
32. See 1 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-101:
16-24 (3d ed. 1981).
33. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (1958).
34. Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 337 (1970).
35. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), in
which the court stated, "Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an ab-
sence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which
are unreasonably favorable to the other party." See also Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 50
Misc.2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
36. See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1305 (1968).
37. Keifer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 39 Wis.2d 20, 158 N.W.2d 288 (1968).
38. MacFarlane v. Peters, 103 Cal. App.3d 627, 163 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1980), in which
the court held that although acts may be legal in and of themselves, if they are done with
fraudulent or oppressive intent, then equity will intervene.
39. Cases are collected in Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Free-
dom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
individual, through contract, to determine his place in society and to
use his initiative to benefit himself and society. Freedom to contract
was but a part of a free society.. This freedom allowed people to cre-
ate their own rights and obligations and to dispose of property
through will or contract,4 ° rather than derive these obligations and
rights from class or family status. The concept of unconscionability
actually will police that freedom and, to an extent, save competent
adults from their own folly.
Under the rubric of unconscionability, courts can use direct
methods of policing the terms of a contract rather than indirect
methods of language construction, or seeming inability to read what
is actually there in print. The problem with unconscionability, how-
ever, as one court has stated, is that "concededly, deciding the issue
is substantially easier than explaining it." 1 If a court is going to
police directly various terms, what guidelines will it use?
Apparently, what is developing under the law of unconscionabil-
ity is essentially a return to the rules of the equity courts of early
England. In the English law, as every common lawyer knows, there
were two principal courts: the law courts and the equity courts. The
equity courts had special remedies for contract breach. For example,
they could force a person to perform his promise. The law courts,
however, could only award damages in the form of money to the
person injured by the breach of the promise. When an individual
went into equity and asked for specific performance of the contract,
equity courts took the position that it was within their discretion to
determine whether to grant specific performance or to withhold it
and, as a result, send the person back to the law side and have him
enforce the breach by money damages. In the exercise of this discre-
tion they examined the contract and withheld their remedy if they
thought: (1) that the contract consideration was grossly inadequate,
or if other terms were unfair; (2) if its enforcement would cause an
unreasonable or disproportionate hardship to the individual against
whom it is enforced; or (3) if this promise was induced by a sharp
practice or some kind of a mistake or misrepresentation that did not
amount to fraud or mistake of such nature that would require the
rescission of the entire contract.42 These same general principles,
long used by the courts of equity, are now making their way into the
law side of the court under the term "unconscionability."
2. Acceptance which varies the terms of the offer.-Another
40. H. Maine, Ancient Law, 163-65 (10th ed. 1918).
41. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 50 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969)
(dealing with the sale of a freezer to a couple on welfare for an inflated price).
42. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 367 (1932).
development in the law of contracts introduced by the Uniform
Commercial Code is that of the effectiveness of an acceptance which
varies the offer. In the common law of offer and acceptance as devel-
oped by the courts, the offeror is in charge of the contract terms; he
makes an offer-which is always a promise-"I will promise to pay
you $5000 if you paint my office building during the month of July a
color of white." The offeree has right to say "yes" or "no" when he
hears this offer. If he says something in between, like "I cannot do it
in July, but I will do it in September," he has not accepted the offer.
The acceptance must mirror the offer. If it varies in any detail, it is
not an acceptance, but a rejection and is itself a new offer.43The
Uniform Commercial Code permits an offeree to vary the terms of
an offer if he has indicated a desire to contract." He then has
formed a contract, and his varied terms, if minor, will become part
of the contract unless specifically objected to by the original offeror.
If his varied terms are major, they will not become a part of the
contract unless assented to by the original offeror. 5 The purpose of
this provision is to provide for the enforcement of a contract when
the buyer makes his offer, usually in writing on a form, and sends it
to the seller, and the seller sends back his acceptance on his own
form which varies in some detail the offer, and the parties then begin
to do business with each other as if they have a contract. Under the
common law, if a contract existed at all, it was under the terms of
the seller's form;46 that is, the party who sent the last form con-
trolled the terms of the contract.
The problem generated by this flexibility in contract formation
introduced by the Uniform Commercial Code is that the oferee may
find himself in a contract not of his choosing, with major varied
terms, which he appeared to be insisting upon at the time of con-
tract, still outside the contract, vainly waiting for the offeror to ac-
cept them. If the terms are onerous to the offeror, the offeror never
will accept them. The only way the offeree can protect himself is to
make it clear when he accepts that his acceptance is expressly condi-
tional on the offeror accepting his new terms.4
This new method of contract formation has caused much litiga-
tion and has not been adopted in full by the drafters of the Uniform
Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of
43. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 59, 60 (1932).
44. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207 (1958).
45. Id. comment 3.
46. See 2 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207:4
(3d ed. 1981).
47. See Lipman, On Winning the Battle of the Forms: An Analysis of Section 2-207 of
the U.C.C., 24 Bus. LAW 789, 803 (1969).
Goods,48 by our common law neighbor, Canada,49 by the Interna-
tional Convention on the Law of Treaties50 or by the Second
Restatement.5
D. Restatement Second of Contracts (1981)
By 1981, half a century had passed since the publication of the
First Restatement of Contracts. The Restatement Second was pub-
lished to reflect not only the changes which fifty years of case law
have wrought, but also to reflect the changes in the common law
caused by the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code. 52 Sev-
eral changes from Restatement First illustrate the movement of con-
tract law in the twentieth century.
1. Unconscionability. A provision on unconscionability appears
in the Second Restatement.5" The doctrine of unconscionability is
emerging as a doctrine not confined to the sale of goods cases, but
equally applicable to the common law generally in which it had al-
ready had a modest beginning54 and in which it had played a major
role in the availability of equitable remedies. 5
2. Good Faith. Another new section in the Second Restate-
ment, also influenced by the Uniform Commercial Code, specifies
good faith in contract performance and enforcement.56 It seems
strange that, in a developed legal system like the common law of
contracts, good faith was so slow to become a part of contract per-
formance. Nevertheless, there were several reasons for this slow de-
velopment. Bad faith was policed by fraud and duress in the bar-
gaining process. Once the bargain on the contract was made, implied
good faith in performance could be defeated by express provisions in
the contract itself. If the contract expressly stated that someone
could do something lawful in itself, then the person was allowed to
48. UNIFORM LAW ON THE FORMATION OF CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GooDs art. 7 (1964), 3 INT'L LEG. MATERIALS 864 (1964); United Nations Convention on
the Uniform Law for International Sales art. 19 (1980), 19 INT'L LEG. MATERIALS 671
(1980). For a comparison of art. 19 with U.C.C. § 2-207, see J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW
FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 165-70 (1982).
49. 1 ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT ON SALE OF GOODS, 81-86 (1979).
50. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 17-23 (1969), 8 INT'L LEG. MATER-
IALS 679 (1969).
51. Murray, Intention Over Terms: An Exploration of U.C.C. § 2-207 and New Section
60, Restatement of Contracts, 37 FORD. L. REV. 317 (1969).
52. See Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1981).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
54. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) and
cases collected in official comment to U.C.C. § 2-302 (1958).
55. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 367 (1932); see also supra text accompanying note
42.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1-203 (1958).
do it. If the individual had the express power to terminate the con-
tract without fault, then he could terminate it without fault. 57 No
implied rule existed that he must terminate only in good faith be-
cause the express term negated such an implication. Now, the exer-
cise of the termination right could be policed either by good faith or
through the doctrine of unconscionability.5 8
Another reason for this slow development of a general rule of
good faith was the existence of specific rules throughout First Re-
statement that tended, standing alone, to exemplify good faith. For
example, an owner could not fail to pay a contractor if the architect
failed to exercise an'honest judgment or was in collusion with the
owner. 59 Nor could a buyer reject goods when his dissatisfaction was
with the bargain and not with the goods. 60 Now, according to the
Second Restatement, the objector would not be performing in good
faith.61
3. Modification of ongoing contracts. A third modification
narrowed again, as did Restatement First, the role that consideration
plays as a basis for the enforcement of promises. The Uniform Com-
mercial Code permits the modification without consideration of an
ongoing contract because of the way in which businessmen operate. 2
As unforeseen events begin to occur during a contract's performance,
it would not be unusual for one businessman to seek and obtain mod-
ification of his obligation or of his right without granting a reciprocal
modification to the other. Under the common law rules of contract,
such an obtained promise to modify would not be enforceable be-
cause consideration was not given for it.
This common law rule is the pre-existing duty rule,63 which per-
forms a valuable function because it inhibits the reaping of the fruits
of economic duress applied during the performance of a contract.
One person may have no reason to make such a modification promise
if he were not economically threatened in some way by the other
party. As an example, a contractor may threaten to quit unless his
price is raised. Quitting may be extremely inconvenient to the owner
at the moment, and he, therefore may agree to raise the price. These
57. Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940).
58. For the distinction between unconscionability and good faith, see Burton, Breach of
Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369, 371
n.14 (1980).
59. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 303 (1932).
60. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 265 comment a, illus. 1 (1932).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 205, 228 comment a, illus. 2 (1981).
62. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209(1) (1958).
63. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 76(a) (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
73 (1981).
modified promises were not enforced at common law. 4 The problem
with the common law, however, was that it would not enforce any
modification without consideration, whether the modification was in
good faith or was coerced. The rule was nondiscriminating. 5
The Uniform Commercial Code laid to rest the pre-existing
duty rule by dispensing with the need for consideration in the modifi-
cation of ongoing contracts.66 The U.C.C. rule was just as nondis-
criminating as the First Restatement rule. Thus, there are some
modifications that should be enforced and others that should not be
enforced because they were elicited through some form of duress6
The Uniform Commercial Code tempers its blanket .approval for all
contract modifications with its requirement of good faith in contract
performance.68 Therefore, even though a change always can be made
without consideration, that change will not be enforced unless it is
made in good faith.
The Second Restatement has provided for the enforcement of
contract changes made without consideration in cases in which the
change is reasonable and is caused by circumstances that were unan-
ticipated at the time the contract was formed. 69 Thus rule is not as
broad as section 2-209(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code but is as
liberal a rule as the case law would permit.
4. Demand for assurances of performance. Another change in
the Restatement, influenced by the Uniform Commercial Code, is
the right of one party to a contract, when he feels that the other
party may not perform, to ask for assurances of future performance.
If such assurances are not forthcoming, then the party who is inse-
cure may withhold his performance.7 0 Caution, however, must be ex-
ercised in utilizing this right. The person's insecurity must be objec-
tively reasonable and the assurances he requests must be
reasonable.71 If they are not, and he couples his request with a threat
not to perform the contract unless such assurances are given, then he
himself is a contract breacher.7 1
At common law, before the Uniform Commercial Code, such
requests for assurances were only permitted when the other party to
64. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
65. See Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 680 (1982).
66. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209(1) (1958).
67. See Hillman, A Study of U.C.C. Methodology: Contract Modification Under Article
Two, 59 N.C.L. REV. 335 (1981).
68. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-203 (1958).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1981).
70. Id. § 257; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-609 (1958).
71. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-609 comment 4 (1958).
72. See Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d
572 (7th Cir. 1976).
the contract was insolvent.7 8 Presently, under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, requests for assurances are permitted in any circum-
stance, even requests for assurances of performance when the person
requesting the assurance feels insecure because of the other party's
past failure to perform an entirely different contract. 74 The Second
Restatement, following the U.C.C., has broadened the rule of the
First Restatement to permit the request for assurances in situations
other than insolvency.75 The case law, however, does not support this
broad rule outside the sale of goods. It will be interesting to see if
the case law will develop along lines similar to the U.C.C., as the
Restatement Second urges.
5. Disputed debts paid by check. If a debtor disagrees with his
creditor about an amount owed, then the debtor could send a check
containing a phrase like "payment in full for material ordered from
creditor." If the creditor, the recipient of the check, saw the notation
on the check and went ahead and cashed it, then the debt was re-
garded as paid in full under the common law. The debtor made an
offer to settle on the check, which offer was accepted by the creditor
when he cashed the check.7 ' The only thing the creditor could do to
avoid this result was to return the check. He was in the embarrass-
ing position of accepting now as full payment what he considered to
be partial payment or taking nothing now.
Cases interpreting the U.C.C. "muddied the waters" of this rule
by permitting the creditor to cash the check if he writes on it "all
rights reserved," thereby allowing him to reject the offer of the
debtor and still cash the check.7 7 These cases are flawed in logic be-
cause a person cannot create a right by reserving a right, and the
creditor had no right to the check of the debtor unless he accepted it
on the terms in which it was offered.
In nonsale of goods cases, the Second Restatement rejects the
U.C.C. case law interpretation and reiterates the fifty year-old prin-
ciple of the First Restatement.78 Merely writing a preservation of
rights on the check and cashing it is not sufficient to create a right to
the check. The offer of the debtor to settle must either be accepted
or rejected. This common law theory is sound contract law. The the-
73. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 287 (1932).
74. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-609 comment 3 (1958) ("[A] ground for insecu-
rity need not arise from or be directly related to the contract in question.") See also Toppert v.
Bunge Corp., 60 I11. App. 3d 607, 377 N.E.2d 324 (1978).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251 (1981).
76. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 420 (1932).
77. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-207 (1958); see also R. SUMMEitS & J. WHITE,
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 13-21 (1972).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281, illus. 6 and Reporter's Note to com-
ment d (1982).
ory underlying the U.C.C. interpretation is not clear because there is
nothing in the comments to the U.C.C. or in its negotiation and
drafting which even contemplated such a result.79
6. Rights of defaulting plaintiffs. The First Restatement, be-
sides being an innovator in third party beneficiaries and in estoppel,
also established law regarding the rights of defaulting plaintiffs.
What right, the early courts asked, does a contract breacher have to
sue his victim? In a leading New York case, the court said that it is
ill doctrine which would permit a substantial contract breacher to
stand before the court as plaintiff and sue the victim of his breach.80
The law, however, has not been as severe on the breacher, as exem-
plified by Restatement First81 and by subsequent cases.82 The con-
tract breacher is viewed not to be suing on the contract, but instead
to be suing for the value of any benefit he may have conferred upon
his victim, less any damage that he has done to his victim by his
breach. The defaulter will receive either the benefit he conferred or
the contract price minus the damages he inflicted, whichever is
less.83 The First Restatement had an exception to this right of the
contract breacher; a willful breacher had no such standing. 4
This exception was not repeated in the Second Restatement. 5
The drafters, following the U.S.C.,8 6 approached the willful breacher
from the standpoint of good faith in the performance and execution
of the contract. This lack of good faith is used more to determine the
substantial nature of the breach, 7 than to prevent the breacher from
suing for the benefit he has conferred on the other party before his
breach.
7. Estoppel. Restatement Second further developed the law of
estoppel.88 It permits estoppel to operate even if there has not been
substantial reliance. The Second Restatement also permits estoppel
79. See Hawland, The Effect of U.C.C. § 1-207 on the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfac-
tion by Conditional Check, 74 CoM. L. J. 329, 331 (1969), in which the author discusses the
failure of the official comments to U.C.C. § 1-207 to include reference to any change in ex-
isting law, thus suggesting a strong argument for the proposition that the drafters did not
intend any change through the application of § 1-207 to a conditional check.
80. Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N.Y. 131 (1881).
81. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 357 (1932).
82. See, e.g., Kirkland v. Archbold, 68 Ohio Law Abstract 481, 113 N.E.2d 496 (Ct.
App. 1953).
83. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 357, illus. 3 (1932).
84. Id. § 357(a)(a) comment e; see also Litel v. Marsh, 33 Wash. 2d 441, 206 P.2d 300
(1949), in which the court refused to allow recovery for a plaintiff guilty of a willful, persistent
and material breach of contract.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 (1981).
86. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-718(2) (1958).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241(e) (1981).
88. Id. § 90; see RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932) and supra text accompany-
ing notes 7, 8, 9 for the Restatement's first formulation of promissory estoppel.
to operate for the benefit of third parties and in cases in which the
promise is not gratuitous, like in situations when the offeror is look-
ing forward to an acceptance that is yet to come.8 9 The latter situa-
tion normally would occur if the offeree must do certain things
before he is in a position to accept.
A common example of this situation is a construction contract
of any magnitude in which the owner of a building, the general con-
tractor and a subcontractor are involved. The general contractor
must get offers from his subcontractors before he knows what type of
offer he will make to the owner. He normally will not accept the
offers of the subcontractors until his offer to the owner has been ac-
cepted. Once the owner accepts his offer, the general contractor is
bound to the contract at a price based on the offers of the subcon-
tractors. If a certain subcontractor withdraws his offer before the
general contractor can accept the offers of all the subcontractors,
then the particular subcontractor should be estopped from doing so.
The subcontractor knew that the general contractor had to rely on
his offer before the general contractor was in a position to accept
it.9
0
One commentator has observed that the general spread of estop-
pel throughout the law of contracts eventually will cause its death.9"
Contract law is based on expectation. Estoppel is based on reliance.
Reliance will undo many rules, like the requirement that some con-
tracts be in writing, that an unaccepted offer may be revoked and
that consideration is necessary for enforcement of a promise. Con-
tract law eventually will look more like the law of torts with the
remedy based on the damage done by an unkept promise, rather
than on recompense for expectations aroused by the promise. These
consequences, of course, are speculations at this time. Whether es-
toppel will be like the proverbial black hole in space and absorb eve-
rything around it must await the observations of contract writers in
the next century. Estoppel clearly will modify, but will not necessa-
rily replace, other more basic notions of contract law. 92
III. Conclusion
Contract law in this century has been subject to a codification
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1981).
90. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958), an example
of this rule in operation. Section 87(2) of the Second Restatement was drafted with this case
in mind.
91. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
92. See Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory
Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 78 (1981). "Like two other grand principles articulated in
the U.C.C. and adopted by the drafters of the Restatement-'good faith' and 'unconscionabil-
ity'-'promissory estoppel' states a principle of abstract justice capable of application in an
infinite variety of factual situations."
or restatement, as have other areas of the common law. Early in this
century, there was a sense of "arriving" at certain clear perceptions
of the law. The same thought process took place in international law.
The law had developed to a point at which it could be categorized,
better known, less uncertain. Before World War II, this codification
or restatement appeared to have been accomplished in contracts.
In the latter part of this century, the reverse has taken place.
The law of contracts is resisting categorization of the applications of
general rules, as evidenced by a reading of the Second Restatement.
The precision and clarity of many of the 385 sections of Restatement
Second compare unfavorably with the 609 sections of the First Re-
statement. More general rules have been formulated, and their appli-
cation to certain situations is less clear.
The twentieth century process most likely will repeat itself in
the twenty-first century. Again there will be, first, the effort to re-
state and then the resistance of contract law to restatement. Again
courts and commentators will break the molds of precise legal rules
and thus contribute to the continuing adjustment of contract law to
new conditions and to the removal of the basic principles which un-
derlie this ancient and useful field of law.
